Abstract-The Jaccard Coefficient, as an information similarity measure, has wide variety of applications, such as cluster analysis and image segmentation. Due to the concerns of personal privacy, the Jaccard Coefficient cannot be computed directly between two independently owned datasets. The problem, secure computation of the Jaccard Coefficient for multisets (SJCM), considers the situation where two parties want to securely compute the random shares of the Jaccard Coefficient between their multisets. During the process, the content of each party's multiset is not disclosed to the other party and also the value of Jaccard Coefficient should be hidden from both parties. Secure computation of multiset intersection cardinality is an important sub-problem of SJCM. Existing methods when applied to solve such a problem can lead to either insecure or inefficient solutions. Our work addresses this gap. We first present a basic SJCM protocol constructed using the existing secure dot product method as a sub-routine. Then, as a major contribution, we propose an approximated version of our basic protocol to improve efficiency without compromising accuracy much. We provide various experimental results to show that the proposed protocols are significantly more efficient than the existing techniques when the domain size is small using both simulated and real datasets.
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INTRODUCTION
I DENTIFYING similar objects plays an important role in scientific community. An object can be a person on social network, a textual file or a molecule. Nevertheless, we usually compare objects drawn from the same domain such as whether two given documents are similar or not. Similarity can be checked using various existing similarity metrics. In general, different measures of similarity are convenient for different types of analysis. One such similarity metric is the Jaccard Coefficient (JC) [1] -a correlation coefficient for measuring similarity between sample sets. This metric is frequently used as a similarity measure for comparing chemical compounds [2] . It also finds its applications in a wide variety of areas such as similarity searching over the web [3] , similar document detection [4] , [5] and social network analysis [6] . In this paper, we concentrate on computing the Jaccard Coefficient over multisets (SJCM) [7] since it is a more general and practical problem than that over simple sets.
When the data are centralized, the problem of computing JC scores is simple because the computation is done in place. However, due to the globalization and various advantages, the data is distributed in many applications. In these scenarios, computing JC is difficult due to the distributed nature of the data, and the problem becomes even more complex due to the privacy issues of the involved parties. In this paper, we restrict our discussion to this distributed environment, and to demonstrate its applicability, we next provide a real-world application.
Consider that there are two parties P 1 and P 2 who hold textual documents. Suppose P 1 want to find out how similar his or her document is in comparison to the P 2 's document by computing the JC score between their private documents. Due to privacy issues, neither party wants to reveal his or her private data to the other party. In the literature, this problem is referred to as secure similar document detection (SSDD) [4] , [5] . Also, if P 1 finds that the JC score is above a certain threshold, he or she can take further action if necessary. This kind of computation is commonly used to detect duplicate documents [5] , [8] either on the web or in a distributed database. We refer to the above process as secure computation of the Jaccard Coefficient over multisets. We emphasize that secure computation of multiset intersection cardinality is an important sub-problem of SJCM. Existing methods, such as secure comparison (e.g., [9] ) and private set intersection cardinality (PSI-CA) (e.g., [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] ), when applied to solve such a problem can lead to either insecure or inefficient solutions. Therefore, the main focus of this paper is to address the above sub-problem rather than the whole SJCM problem (see Section 1.1 for more details). The protocols proposed in this paper are significantly more efficient than the existing techniques when the domain size is small. It is worth noting that the domain size is usually small in many practical applications. For example, consider the inputs from domains age, temperature, salary, medical treatment, sensitive locations for terrorist, etc. For completeness, we illustrate two concrete scenarios below where the domain size is small and our protocols can be efficiently applied.
Suppose CIA has a terrorist suspect, and it wants to know if there are similar suspects in the Interpol's database. The similarity can be based on locations (e.g., cities or specific regions) the suspect has traveled or stayed, ages or nationalities. Known locations to harvest terrorists, ages and nationalities have typically very small domains. For a new customer to get a car or health insurance, an agent needs to run some risk analysis to determine the premium. Suppose a third party agent cannot directly access a remote database containing risk classifications among existing customers of a particular company. These classifications are generally based on age, income level (e.g., below 30 k, between [30 k, 60 k], or above), and occupation. These attributes have small domains. Thus, our solutions can be practically applied if Jaccard Coefficient is used to identify which risk class the new customer belongs to. In general, apart from the above examples, SJCM is useful in various applications of Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) that require identification of similar objects. SMC [14] is practical and has many real-world applications (e.g., [15] , [16] ). This paper proposes practical solutions to the SJCM problem towards this end. Also, many privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) tasks [17] , [18] under the SMC framework can benefit from our proposed protocols.
Problem Definition
Let P 1 and P 2 be two parties, each of whom has a multiset denoted by D 1 and D 2 , respectively. Suppose the elements in D 1 and D 2 are drawn from a positive integer domain f0; 1; . . . ; m À 1g. Then, the JC score between D 1 and D 2 is given by
where jD 1 \ D 2 j denotes the intersection size (or cardinality) between the multisets D 1 and D 2 (more details about the above formula are given in Section 3). The problem of secure computation of the Jaccard Coefficient over multisets considers computing JCðD 1 ; D 2 Þ in a privacy-preserving manner. In order to securely compute JCðD 1 ; D 2 Þ, following from Equation 1, it is clear that we need to (1) securely compute jD 1 \ D 2 j (e.g., either by computing random shares of the intersection size or encryption of the intersection size) without disclosing the actual intersection size and (2) utilize a secure division protocol on the outputs resulted from the first step, jD 1 j and jD 2 j. Since the second step can be easily achieved using the existing secure division protocols, we are motivated to efficiently compute step 1. Therefore, we reduced the SJCM problem to step 1 and this paper mainly focuses on the secure computation of the random shares of jD 1 \ D 2 j. More formally, we define the SJCM protocol as follows:
At the end of SJCM, P 1 and P 2 know their respective random shares x 1 and x 2 , where x 1 þ x 2 (modulo group size) is equal to jD 1 \ D 2 j. A solution to the SJCM problem can be easily adopted as a building block in larger privacypreserving applications. For example, given the random shares of jD 1 \ D 2 j, we can securely compute the random shares of JCðD 1 ; D 2 Þ using the existing secure division protocols. Similarly, our protocols can be easily extended to securely verify whether JCðD 1 ; D 2 Þ is greater than a threshold value.
Main Contributions
The existing methods for secure computation of Jaccard Coefficient works only for simple sets (e.g., [5] , [19] , [20] ); therefore, they are not directly applicable to the SJCM problem. Alternative security primitives (such as secure minimum) can be utilized to solve the SJCM protocol, however, we observed that such constructions are less efficient. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
We first propose a solution to the SJCM problem that satisfies the semi-honest security definition of Secure Multi-party Computation [14] .
To improve the efficiency, we next present an approximated version of the proposed protocol using heuristics (denoted by SJCM apr ). The approximation method acts as a trade-off between accuracy and efficiency providing the similar level of privacy as in the proposed SJCM protocol. We provide theoretical bounds for the approximation algorithm.
In addition, we empirically analyze the practical value of the proposed protocols through extensive experiments which further justify our theoretical analysis. By using a real dataset, we show that our approximation protocol provides good accuracy and at the same time is more efficient than the current state-ofthe-art techniques. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related work. Section 3 presents some concepts and properties as a background. Section 4, by using the existing security primitives, demonstrates possible direct solutions to SJCM and highlights why such straightforward solutions are either insecure or inefficient. Section 5 discusses the proposed method in detail. Section 6 presents our approximation method. The effectiveness of the approximation method and its theoretical upper bounds are analyzed in Section 7. We present the experimental results in Section 8 and conclude the paper with future work in Section 9.
RELATED WORK
In the past decade, several Secure Multi-party Computation [14] platforms have been developed and implemented under different security models and assumptions (e.g., [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] ). Recently, Huang et al. [25] developed a Javabased framework, referred to as FastGC, that can efficiently implement the garbled circuits (GCs) by considering various circuit-level optimizations and pipelining the process of circuit construction and evaluation. FastGC is the currently known fastest implementation of GCs under the semi-honest model. The authors of FastGC claim that their framework allows users to implement GC-based approaches that are practical as well as competitive to the corresponding custom-designed protocols. Some recent implementations based on FastGC (e.g., [26] and [27] ) provide some (but not sufficient) evidence to support their claim. While their claim can be true for certain applications, we believe that deciding between the custom-designed and GC techniques for better efficiency depends on the underlying application. Since there exist a vastly large number of applications, it is hard to check whether the author's claim is true for each application. As a counter example, we show that our proposed protocols are more efficient than the recent implementations based on FastGC (see Sections 4 and 8 for more details).
Security Definition
To maximize privacy or minimize information disclosure, we adopt the security definitions from the literature of SMC [14] . We assume that parties are semi-honest; that is, a semihonest party follows the rules of the protocol using its correct input, but the party is free to use what he or she sees during an execution of the protocol to compromise security. Due to space limitations, we refer the reader to [14] for detailed security definitions and models.
Secure Jaccard Coefficient for Simple Sets
Broadly speaking, the problem investigated in this paper is related to the field of privacy-preserving data mining, and many secure protocols have been developed to solve specific problems in PPDM [17] , [18] , [28] , [29] . Our work is directly associated with secure similar document detection. There exist a considerable amount of work on SSDD in the literature (e.g., [4] , [5] ). In particular, protocols in [4] , [5] , [19] aim to securely compute the Jaccard Coefficient between two sets. Under the semi-honest setting, the work in [5] was later improved in [20] , by reducing the cost using MinHash techniques. Nonetheless, existing protocols are applicable only for sets; therefore, they do not take frequency of elements (such as words or n-grams in a document) into account. (In later sections we show that alternative and direct solutions from the existing methods are either insecure or inefficient.) However, in many applications we need to securely compute the Jaccard Coefficient between multisets where the importance of an element depends on its frequency. Along this direction, in this paper, we propose a new SJCM protocol that works for both sets and multisets. Further, we propose certain heuristics to improve the efficiency of the protocol.
PRELIMINARIES
Multiset and the Jaccard Coefficient
We use the same formulation for computing JC score between multisets as mentioned in [7] . The JC score between multisets D 1 and D 2 is given below:
The intersection Let f D be the multiplicity function over a multiset D with domain f0; 1; . . . ; m À 1g. For 0 i m À 1, f D ðiÞ simply returns the number of times (i.e., frequency) an element i occurs in D. The following properties hold:
Additive Homomorphic Encryption
In the proposed protocols, we use an additive homomorphic and probabilistic public key encryption (HEnc þ ) system. Let E pk and D sk be the encryption and decryption functions in an HEnc þ system with public key pk and secret key sk. Without sk, no one can discover a from E pk ðaÞ in polynomial time. For a; b 2 P , where P denotes the plaintext space, the HEnc þ system exhibits the following properties:
Additive homomorphic: D sk ðE pk ðaÞ Ã E pk ðbÞÞ ¼ a þ b; Given a constant c 2 P and E pk ðaÞ :
D sk ðE pk ðaÞ c Þ ¼ a Ã c; The encryption function has semantic security [30] , i.e., a set of ciphertexts do not provide additional information about the plaintext. Any HEnc þ system is applicable, but this paper adopts Paillier's scheme [31] for the actual implementation due to its efficiency, particularly when the plaintext values are small. Under Paillier cryptosystem, P ¼ Z N , where N denotes the RSA modulus.
POSSIBLE DIRECT SOLUTIONS
In this section, we discuss a set of existing techniques that can possibly be used to compute the random shares of jD 1 \ D 2 j and demonstrate why such direct solutions are either insecure or inefficient.
Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA)
Since 
The well-known existing two-party (under semi-honest setting) PSI-CA protocols (e.g., [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] ) are mostly based on the following three techniques: (i) oblivious polynomial evaluations, (ii) oblivious pseudo-random functions, and (iii) commutative encryption schemes. The existing PSI-CA protocols based on these three techniques have almost the same disadvantages. For example, consider the PSI-CA protocols based on the polynomial evaluations. These protocols leak valuable information, such as the size of D 0 1 , i.e., jD 1 j (assuming P 1 holds the secret key) to P 2 . A trivial solution to resolve this issue is to add dummy values to D 0 1 . For security reasons, such a modification should always reveal only the upper bound of jD 1 j to P 2 . However, since the upper bound on the size of the multisets is m Ã n (n denotes the maximum frequency), P 1 has to construct an encrypted polynomial of size m Ã n. Evaluation of such large polynomials will trivially be expensive. Another solution is to use size-hiding PSI protocols (e.g., [32] ) that can hide jD 1 j from P 2 . However, they reveal the intersection multiset (i.e., D 1 \ D 2 ) to P 1 .
In general, the main issue with the above PSI-CA protocols is that they cannot facilitate the users to compute either the encryption or random shares of the intersection size without revealing jD 1 \ D 2 j to at least one of the parties. This is an inherent problem coming from the usage of polynomial evaluations since decryption operations have to be performed in any case by P 1 to compute jD In this direction, Huang et al. [26] recently proposed three classes of PSI protocols targeted to different sizes and domains based on Yao's garbled circuit technique. Their protocols were implemented on top of the FastGC framework [25] . Note that, as explained in [26] , their protocols can be easily modified to compute jD 2 j (as part of the circuit). We explicitly mention that this step should be followed by a modulo N operation (within the circuit) for security and correctness reasons. Also, P 1 sets his/her random share
is the final output of the circuit which will be known only to P 2 . After this, P 2 sets his/her random share
To the best of our knowledge, the third protocol given in [26] (denoted as SCS-WN meaning Sort-Compare-Shuffle with Waksman's oblivious switching Network) is the best known efficient implementation for PSI (as well as for PSI-CA) till date. Nevertheless, as we show in Section 8, our proposed protocols are much more efficient than the SJCM solution constructed using SCS-WN.
Secure Integer Comparison (SIC)
Under the semi-honest two-party setting, the secure integer comparison (SIC) protocol considers P 1 with input a and P 2 with input b, and returns the shares of the functionality b a without revealing any information regarding a (resp., b ) to P 2 (resp., P 1 ). Other variations of SIC include ða; E pk ðbÞÞ, ðE pk ðaÞ; E pk ðbÞÞ, or shares of a and b as private inputs. However, we restrict our discussion to the SIC protocols of the former case since they are more suitable (as explained below) for our SJCM problem.
As mentioned in Section 3, we have
For 0 i m À 1, P 1 with input f D 1 ðiÞ and P 2 with input f D 2 ðiÞ can compute the encryption of minðf D 1 ðiÞ; f D 2 ðiÞÞ using the existing SIC protocols. At first, it seems that using the generic SIC protocol which is based on the standard circuit evaluation [33] seems to be an efficient approach. However, to validate this, we ran a small set of experiments. Interestingly, we observed that the generic solution implemented using the FastGC [25] framework is much slower than the custom-designed SIC protocol proposed by Nergiz et al. [9] . Therefore, to the best of the our knowledge, we emphasize that the solution in [9] is the most efficient SIC protocol (under the semi-honest twoparty setting) which computes the shared output for functionality (i.e., checking whether f D 2 ðiÞ f D 1 ðiÞÞ. In order to apply this SIC protocol in solving the SJCM problem, we first need to assume that the multisets have restricted frequencies. That is, f D 1 ðiÞ and f D 2 ðiÞ can be at most n, for 0 i m À 1. This kind of assumption is practical where n is a publicly known value. Let u 1;i and u 2;i be the random output shares of P 1 and P 2 resulting from the SIC protocol, respectively. As mentioned in [9] , if f D 2 ðiÞ f D 1 ðiÞ, then u 1;i È u 2;i ¼ 1, and 0 otherwise. Once the random shares are generated for 0 i m À 1, P 1 and P 2 can compute E pk ðjD 1 \ D 2 jÞ (known only to P 2 ) using the following formula:
where
We emphasize that the above formulation can be computed by P 1 and P 2 (in encrypted form) in a single communication round as follows. Initially, P 1 sends hE pk ðu 1;i Þ; E pk ðf D 1 ðiÞÞ; E pk ðu 1;i Ã f D 1 ðiÞÞi to P 2 , for 0 i m À 1. Upon receiving, P 2 computes E pk ðjD 1 \ D 2 jÞ using homomorphic properties. Note that u 2;i and f D 2 ðiÞ are known to P 2 , for 0 i m À 1. Also, it is straightforward to compute the random shares of
By Composition Theorem [34] , we observe that the SJCM solution constructed by using the Nergiz's SIC protocol (denoted as SJCM sic ) as sub-routine is secure. Based on the above discussions, it is clear that by adding "dummies" to the input sets, some of the existing protocols (such as SCS-WN) achieve similar privacy properties as ours for the same Oðm Ã nÞ costs. In addition, SJCM sic provides similar privacy properties as ours for the same Oðm Ã nÞ costs. It is, however, that the hidden constants in our approximation protocol are small and thus making our protocol faster than the existing protocols. In Section 8, we compare the performances of the proposed approximation approach with SJCM sic on a real dataset. Our empirical results show that the approximation approach is significantly efficient than the SJCM sic protocol but yet providing similar security guarantees and good accuracy.
THE BASIC SJCM PROTOCOL
We propose a basic SJCM protocol to securely compute the random shares of jD 1 \ D 2 j. For the rest of this paper, we explicitly make the following assumptions: P 1 generates a public-secret key pair ðpk; skÞ based on the Paillier cryptosystem (or any other HEnc þ system as discussed in Section 3), and sends pk to P 2 . Here sk is known only to P 1 . The elements of the multisets are drawn from the positive integer domain ½0; m À 1, where m is the domain size. In addition, we assume that 0 f D 1 ðiÞ; f D 2 ðiÞ n, for 0 i m À 1, where n is the maximum frequency of elements in D 1 and D 2 . This is an acceptable limitation in many applications and one can vary m and n depending on the underlying application requirements. Because D 1 and D 2 are private multisets of P 1 and P 2 , respectively, we assume that f D 1 is private to P 1 and f D 2 is private to P 2 . However, in practice, P 1 (resp., P 2 ) might know some information about D 2 (resp., D 1 ). Nevertheless, in the proposed SJCM protocol, P 1 and P 2 cannot deduce any additional information other than what they have already known. The main steps involved in the proposed SJCM protocol are shown in Algorithm 1. First, we describe the pre-processing step for the proposed SJCM protocol. Note that the pre-process step can be performed as an offline step since no communication is required between the two parties. During the pre-processing step, P 1 and P 2 compute their frequency matrices M 1 and M 2 of size m Ã n using D 1 and D 2 , respectively. For 0 i m À 1, P 1 computes M 1 ½i as follows.
If f D 1 ðiÞ > 0 :
Similarly, P 2 computes his/her frequency matrix M 2 . As an example, Table 1 shows the frequency matrices corresponding to two sample multisets. After M 1 and M 2 are generated, the two parties jointly compute the random shares of jD 1 \ D 2 j. At the end of SJCM, P 1 and P 2 know their respective random shares x 1 and x 2 . Remember that the goal of SJCM is to securely compute x 1 and x 2 such that
where N is the RSA modulus or part of the public key pk under Paillier cryptosystem.
We now explain our main intuition behind SJCM which follows from Observation 5.1 as given below. 
To start with, both parties independently compute M 1 and M 2 from their private inputs D 1 and D 2 . After this, P 1 and P 2 securely compute E pk ðM 1 ½i M 2 ½iÞ using the existing secure dot product (SDP) protocols, for 0 i m À 1. We emphasize that there exist several approaches to compute SDP in the literature. In this paper, for efficiency reasons, we adopt the SDP protocol proposed by Goethals et al. [35] that is based on homomorphic encryption.
Initially, at
Step (a) of Algorithm 1, P 1 encrypts the individual entries in M 1 and sends them to P 2 . Based on the additive homomorphic property of the encryption scheme, selected steps are described below:
Step (b):
Step (c):
Upon computing S as above, P 2 randomizes it to get S 0 ¼ E pk ðjD 1 \ D 2 j þ rÞ, where r is a random number in Z N (known only to P 2 ). Then, P 2 sets his/her random share x 2 as N À r and sends S 0 to P 1 . Finally, P 1 decrypts S 0 and sets Table 2 .
Complexity and Security Analyses
The complexity of SJCM consists of local computational cost as well as communication cost between the two parties and they depend on the underlying SDP protocol. Briefly, assuming that the SDP method in [35] is used, the computational complexity for P 1 is bounded by Oðm Ã nÞ number of encryptions whereas the computational complexity for P 2 is bounded by Oð mÃn log 2 N Þ number of encryptions. On the other hand, the total communication complexity of SJCM is bounded by OðK Ã m Ã nÞ in bits, where K denotes the encryption key size in bits. 
Claim 5.1. The SJCM protocol presented in Algorithm 1 is secure under the semi-honest model, assuming that m and n are known to P 1 and P 2 .
Input to P 1 : D 1 and sk Input to P 2 : D 2 (Note: m; n; and pk are public)
Output of P 1 : The random share x 1 Output of P 2 : The random share x 2 Pre-process: For i ¼ 1 and 2, P i computes M i from D i , m and n Execution: (a). P 1 computes Z½i½j ¼ E pk ðM 1 ½i½jÞ and sends it to P 2 for 0 i m À 1 and 0 j n À 1 (b). P 2 receives the ciphertexts and computes S i ¼ Q nÀ1 j¼0^M 2 ½i½j¼1 Z½i½j, for 0 i m À 1 (c). P 2 computes S ¼ Q mÀ1 i¼0 S i and selects a random number r 2 Z N (d). P 2 sets x 2 ¼ N À r, randomizes S with r and sends the resulting ciphertext S 0 to P 1 (e). P 1 decrypts the ciphertext S 0 to get x 1
As mentioned in [35] , the SDP sub-protocol used in SJCM is secure under the semi-honest model. In SJCM, the only information revealed to P 2 is an encrypted matrix Z. As a result, the security analysis for P 2 can be directly derived based on the security of the underlying encryption scheme. Since our work uses a semantically secure encryption scheme (e.g., Paillier's scheme), for P 2 , the ciphertexts in Z are computationally indistinguishable from random values in Z N 2 . Thus, no information is revealed to P 2 . In addition, since r is randomly chosen from Z N and known only to P 2 , the decryption operation on S 0 by P 1 yields a pseudo-random number. Thus, the sequential composition of SDP with Steps (d) and (e) of Algorithm 1 lead to a protocol that is secure under the semihonest model according to the Composition Theorem [34] . This proves the above claim. For completeness, we provided the formal security proof for SJCM in our technical report [36] .
EFFICIENCY OPTIMIZED AND ACCURACY APPROXIMATED SJCM PROTOCOL
In this section, we focus on improving the efficiency of the SJCM protocol at the cost of degraded accuracy. In general, for any secure protocol, the computational complexity depends on the number of encryption operations performed. For the proposed protocol, both the computational and communication complexities depend on the size of frequency matrices. That is, the domain size m and the maximum frequency n are the deciding factors. In this direction, we present an approximation method (a heuristic approach) that reduces the computational cost and communication cost by reducing the size of the frequency matrices yet achieving reasonable accuracy. The basic idea is to minimize the number of columns in the frequency matrix. By applying the approximation method, we can generate frequency matrices of size m Ã t 1 t n ð Þinstead of m Ã n. The approximation protocol, denoted by SJCM apr , has the benefit of reducing both the communication and computational costs over SJCM.
The potential performance improvement of the SJCM apr protocol comes at the expense of degraded accuracy. However, in the coming sections, we will theoretically and empirically show that the deviation in the accuracy is not that significant. In addition to the assumptions made in Section 5, we make the following further assumptions:
We define two performance variables w 0 and w 1 , such that 1 w 0 < w 1 n, known to both participating parties. These performance variables act as a trade-off between accuracy and efficiency. Therefore, the parties can choose w 0 and w 1 values depending on the application requirements. When w 0 ¼ 1 and w 1 ¼ n, the SJCM apr protocol reduces to SJCM. For the rest of this section, we assume w 0 > 1 and fix the value of w 1 to n. However, in Section 8, we also empirically analyze the case where w 0 > 1 and w 1 < n on a real dataset and show its effect on efficiency and the accuracy. Note that, in the SJCM protocol, the performance variables w 0 and w 1 are not used and only the values of m and n are known to both parties. Since the approximation method mainly targets on reducing the number of columns in the frequency matrix, we next present the approximated pre-processing stage (off-line computation) that achieves this goal.
Pre-Processing Step
The In the above example, the new frequency matrices are of size m Ã t ¼ 5 Ã 2. In SJCM, the frequency matrices are of size m Ã n ¼ 5 Ã 4. Clearly, in this example, the approximation method reduces the size of frequency matrix by a factor of 2.
In general, as M 
Otherwise,
Proof. 
Similarly, when a 1;i > a 2;i , we can show that d e is always equal to minðb 1;j Ã b 2;j Þ. Hence, when w 0 ¼f1; 2; 3g,
On the other hand, i.e., when w 0 ! 4 or a 1;i ¼ a 2;i , we have the following deductions:
This proves our Observation 6.1. t u
The above discussions clearly imply that the approximations are always less than or equal to the actual values: M 1 ½i M 2 ½i and jD 1 \ D 2 j. Note that w 1 ¼ n in the above observations. Example 6.2. Refer to Example 6.1. It can be observed that therefore, leading to less accuracy. We also ran a small set of experiments and observed the same. Therefore, based on the above discussions, we prefer to compute the random shares
e which is approximately close to the value of jD 1 \ D 2 j in the proposed SJCM apr protocol. In Section 8, we empirically analyze the accuracy of SJCM apr and show that the reduction in accuracy is not significant.
In theory, for a fixed w 0 , we observe that the accuracy of SJCM apr either remains constant or increases with an increase in w 1 . That is, when w 1 < n, we expect a decrease in the accuracy of SJCM apr . However, this depends on the values of t ¼ d e and w 0 ; therefore, the accuracy can still remain the same as in the case of w 1 ¼ n. Also, with an increase in w 0 value, the accuracy of SJCM apr decreases even for a fixed w 1 . In particular, w 0 and w 1 values provide a trade-off between accuracy and efficiency. More details are given in Section 7.
The Proposed SJCM apr Protocol
The overall steps involved in the proposed SJCM apr protocol are given in Algorithm 2. Initially, during the pre-processing step, P i computes his/her modified frequency matrix (a). for 0 i m À 1 do:
Apart from the above pre-processing step, SJCM apr also utilizes the SDP protocol as in SJCM. However, because of Observation 6.2 and the modified frequency matrices M 0 1 and M 0 2 , the implementation of SJCM apr is different from SJCM and consists the following two stages.
Based on M 0 1 and M 0 2 , at the end of this stage, P 1 has a partial random share a 1;i and P 2 has a partial random share a 2;i , such that a 1;i þa 2;i À c i Ã ðX 1 ½i _ X 2 ½iÞ mod N % M 1 ½i M 2 ½i, where c i is a control parameter (more details are given in the later part of this section). Stage B-Estimating Random Shares of jD 1 \ D 2 j:
During this stage, P 1 and P 2 initially compute the random shares of À P mÀ1 i¼0 c i Ã ðX 1 ½i _ X 2 ½iÞ, say b 1 and b 2 , respectively. Then, P 1 and P 2 compute a 1 ¼ P mÀ1 i¼0 a 1;i mod N and a 2 ¼ P mÀ1 i¼0 a 2;i mod N respectively. Finally, P 1 and P 2 locally compute their respective random shares of approximated jD 1 \ D 2 j based on ha 1 ; b 1 i and ha 2 ; b 2 i. More precisely, P 1 sets x 1 to a 1 þ b 1 mod N and P 2 sets x 2 to a 2 þ b 2 mod N.
We now detail the main steps involved in Stages A and B of SJCM apr that are different from SJCM.
Step 3(a).
where c i ¼ 0 if r i mod w 0 ¼ 0, and c i ¼ 1 otherwise. In addition, when c i ¼ 1, we have t i = E pk ð1Þ if X 1 ½i or X 2 ½i ¼ 1. Else, t i ¼ E pk ð0Þ.
Step 3(c).
Step 4(b).
Step 4(c). ½i. Hence, in this case, we believe that the value of a 1;i þ a 2;i will get closer to the actual value M 1 ½i M 2 ½i. However, a 1;i þ a 2;i can also lead to overestimation from M 1 ½i M 2 ½i in the former case. Nevertheless, for large values of w 0 , the probability for overestimation from M 1 ½i M 2 ½i is less. These conclusions are justified by our experimental results in Section 8.
Also, since b 1 ¼ r À P mÀ1 i¼0 c i Ã ðX 1 ½i _ X 2 ½iÞ mod N, P 1 's random share is given by:
Similarly, P 2 's random share is given by
Therefore,
It is important to note that, for any given index i, if c i ¼ 1 and
Based on the above discussions and according to Observations 6.1, 6.3 and 6.4, we can conclude that
At the end of SJCM apr , P 1 knows x 1 and P 2 knows x 2 , and no other information is revealed to them.
When w 0 > 1, the modified frequency matrices M 0 1 and M 0 2 have less number of dimensions in comparison to the actual number of dimensions defined by m and n in the SJCM protocol. Therefore, SJCM apr is more efficient than the SJCM protocol. The complexity costs of SJCM apr are as follows. The computational complexity of P 1 is bounded by O m Ã t ð Þ number of encryptions and O m ð Þ number of decryptions. On the other hand, the computational complexity of P 2 is bounded by O m ð Þ encryptions and O m Ã t ð Þ exponentiations as well as homomorphic additions. Furthermore, the communication complexity of SJCM apr is given by O K Ã m Ã t ð Þ in bits, where K is the security parameter (i.e., length of N in bits).
The SJCM apr protocol is also secure in the semi-honest model under the assumption that m, w 0 , and w 1 are known to both participating parties (note that w 0 and w 1 do not leak any additional information to P 1 and P 2 ). The security proof for SJCM apr is very similar to that of SJCM, and for completeness, we included it in our technical report [36] . The effectiveness of SJCM apr mainly depends on the value of x 1 þ x 2 mod N and how close it is to the intersection size jD 1 \ D 2 j. Therefore, we will theoretically and empirically evaluate the quality of this approximation in Sections 7 and 8, respectively.
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS-EXPECTED UPPER BOUNDS
From the previous discussions, it is clear that SJCM apr is a heuristic approach that gives the random shares for the approximated jD 1 \ D 2 j. In general, the practicality of any heuristic approach depends on how well the boundaries are defined. In this section, we theoretically derive various upper bounds for our heuristic approach. Also, from our analysis, it will be clear how w 0 and w 1 affect the accuracy of SJCM apr . These results will serve as a guidance on how to determine the appropriate values of w 0 and w 1 and the theoretical derivations are further supported by our empirical results in Section 8.
To
Here j; k 2 ½0; w 1 and f apr ½i is equal to either d [37] . Since D 1 and D 2 are independent and the number of possible values j and k can take are 1 þ w 1 , the following properties hold:
With these properties, Equation (5) can be expanded as:
ABS error ðj; kÞ ð1 þ jÞ Ã ð1 þ kÞ
EABS error is the same for 0 i m À 1 and not all values of j and k can result in error. That is, ABS error ¼ 0 for certain values of j and k. As mentioned in Section 6, j and k can be expressed as following linear equations:
It is a common standard to use Zipfian distribution in natural language processing to model word frequency since the word frequencies in textual documents follow Zipf's law. e is always equal to M 1 ½i M 2 ½i when b j or b k takes a value from the set f0; 1; w 0 À 1g irrespective of the value of a j and a k . In addition, when a j ¼ a k , ABS error can be simplified as follows:
where h ¼ 0 or 1. Note that the above simplification is independent of w 1 . We also observe that when a j ¼ a k , any given fixed pair ðb j ; b k Þ gives the same value of ABS error and is independent of the values of a j and a k (assuming h is the same). Because of the above simplification, it is clear that ABS error depends only on b j ; b k , and w 0 . (Observe that the values of b j and b k depend on j and k, respectively.) When w 1 is not a multiple of w 0 (i.e., w 1 is not divisible by w 0 ), we know that 0 a j ; a k b
c. For convenience, we assume that w 0 divides w 1 (but similar analysis can be derived for other cases). Then, the possible values of a j and a k are 0; . . . ;
. Also, as mentioned earlier, ABS error is independent of the values of a j and a k . However, any given ðb j ; b k Þ pair can occur for different values of a j ¼ a k . In addition, for any given a j and a k , we know that 0 b j ; b k w 0 À 1 and we have as the values of b j and b k are always zero under this case. We now simplify Equation (6) as follows:
where r ¼ 2 ðw 0 Ãlnðw 1 ÞÞ 2 . Note that h is either 0 or 1 and its value purely depends on j; k; r i , and w 0 .
Upper Bound Analysis
We now present the worst-case scenario by analyzing the upper bounds for ABS error and EABS error .
Upper bound for absolute error. For any given ðj; kÞ, the upper bound for ABS error ðj; kÞ is given as:
Note that minðb j ; b k Þ is always less than or equal to d b j Ãb k w 0 e and we assume h ¼ 0 to derive the upper bound. In the above analysis, we assume that w 0 ! 4 since the possible non-zero value for ABS error is always 1 (which is also the upper bound in this case) for 1 w 0 3. It is also clear that the upper bound for ABS error increases with an increase in w 0 . Note that there may exist multiple pairs of ðb j ; b k Þ giving the same upper bound value of ABS error ðj; kÞ for a given w 0 value. We simply pick b j ¼ b k ¼ b w 0 2 c since this pair always gives a maximum absolute error.
Upper bound for expected absolute error. When a j = a k , the number of pairs of ðb j ; b k Þ that can give non-zero absolute error are w 2 0 as ABS error can be non-zero for 0 b j ; b k w 0 À 1. From equations (7) and (8), the upper bound for EABS error is given by:
It is clear that the upper bound for EABS error depends only on w 0 and w 1 . For a fixed w 1 , the upper bound for EABS error increases with w 0 . Also, for a fixed value of w 0 , the upper bound for EABS error decreases when w 1 increases. This observation also matches our empirical results in Section 8.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present a thorough empirical analysis on SJCM and SJCM apr in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. We show that our protocols are significantly more efficient than the recent work [26] . Further, we compare the accuracy and efficiency of SJCM apr with SJCM sic (i.e., the SJCM solution based on [9] as discussed in Section 4) on a real dataset.
Platform and Dataset Generation
The proposed protocols were implemented in C, and experiments were conducted on a Linux machine, running Ubuntu 10.04 LTS, with an Intel Xeon Six-Core 3.07 GHz processor and 12 GB memory. Since it is difficult to control the parameters in a real dataset to analyze the time complexity, multisets are randomly generated in the experiments based on two parameters: m and n. (In addition to the generated datasets, a real dataset is also used in our performance comparison for 1 < w 0 < w 1 < n.) For a fixed value of hm; ni, five multiset pairs of D 1 and D 2 are randomly generated, and the results are presented as the average values taken over these five pairs. In our experiments on random datasets, we fix w 1 to n.
To generate multisets, we first select 80 percent of elements randomly from f0; m À 1g and assign frequencies to each selected element randomly in the range ½0; w 1 (note that w 1 ¼ n in simulated datasets).
Time Complexity Analysis
We remind that the goal of SJCM apr is to improve the efficiency in comparison to SJCM without degrading accuracy much. Fig. 1a (here, m ¼ 5 K denotes m ¼ 5; 000 ). It can be observed that when either m or n doubled, the computational cost of SJCM is almost doubled.
On the other hand, when w 0 > 1, the computation cost of SJCM apr varies with w 0 , even for a fixed values of m and w 1 ð¼ nÞ, due to the reduction in the number of dimensions in the corresponding modified frequency matrices. In theory, the computation cost of SJCM apr is expected to improve by roughly a factor of w 1 t , where w 1 ¼ n and t ¼ d The theoretical expected speedup factor (labeled as Exp) increases from 1 to 20 when w 0 varies from 1 to 20. However, for 1,024 bit key, the actual observed speedup factor for SJCM apr changes from 1 to 10.07 when w 0 changes from 1 to 20. Precisely, the running time of SJCM apr varies from 70.15 to 6.96 minutes as w 0 changes from 1 to 20. Similarly, for K = 2,048, the actual speedup factor of SJCM apr varies from 1 to 9.82.
We also analyzed the running time of SJCM apr by varying m and w 0 values for K ¼ 1,024 bits and w 1 ¼ n ¼ 80. As shown in Fig. 1c , for a given m, the running time of SJCM apr reduces by almost a factor of 2 when w 0 doubles. E.g., when m ¼ 15K, cost of SJCM apr reduces from 13.45 to 7.99 minutes when w 0 varies from 5 to 10. However, when w 0 increases from 10 to 15, the improvement is small as the number of dimensions do not change much. Similar results can be observed for other values of w 1 and w 0 . We observed that the running time of SJCM apr decreases by at least a factor of 7 when w 0 varies from 1 to 15 for any given m and w 1 values. In summary, the total running time and communication costs of SJCM apr for varying values of w 0 are given in Table 3 .
Additionally, we compared the running time of SJCM with the corresponding solution constructed using SCS-WN 2 [26] , denoted by SJCM SCS-WN , which was mentioned in Section 4. For m = 5K and w 1 ¼ 20, the size of multisets (on average) in our simulated datasets is roughly 49,558. Under these values, the running time of SJCM SCS-WN is roughly 11.86 minutes whereas, refer to Fig. 1a , the running time of SJCM is 4.29 minutes. In this case, SJCM is about two times faster than SJCM SCS-WN . Based on the above results, we can expect SJCM apr to be much more efficient than SJCM SCS-WN . E.g., when w 0 ¼ 10, SJCM apr is at least 10 times more efficient than SJCM SCS-WN .
Effectiveness of SJCM apr
Remember that SJCM always yields 100 percent accuracy. Therefore, we evaluate the accuracy of SJCM apr with respect to SJCM. The accuracy of SJCM apr mainly depends on w 0 and w 1 , so m is fixed to 5,000 throughout this section. The accuracy of SJCM apr with respect to SJCM is analyzed from two different aspects: final output accuracy and elementbased pairwise accuracy. The accuracies are based on the actual JC scores. 
Final Output Accuracy
We emphasize that the inequality JCðD 1 ; D 2 Þ ! JC apr ðD 1 ; D 2 Þ may not always holds, and the value of Accuracy out can be greater than 1 (due to overestimation). However, we observed that the deviation of JC apr ðD 1 ; D 2 Þ from JCðD 1 ; D 2 Þ is not that significant. Due to space limitations, we refer the reader to our technical report [36] for the element-based pairwise accuracy definition and the corresponding experimental results on the simulated datasets.
Performance Analysis using a Real Dataset
As mentioned in Section 4, the existing PSI-CA methods cannot completely address the SJCM problem. Therefore, in this section, we compare the performance of SJCM apr with that of SJCM sic (i.e., the secure integer comparison based SJCM solution discussed in Section 4.2) for varying w 0 values using a real dataset.
In the previous sections, we fixed w 1 to n. However, in this section, we will show that the accuracy is still good when w 1 < n. We randomly selected 500 documents from the 20 Usenet newsgroups dataset (a collection of approximately 20,000 newsgroup documents) available in the UCI KDD Archive [38] . Each document is represented as a multiset of tri-grams. The whole set of 500 documents contains 21,726 (¼ m) unique tri-grams representing the global size of the vector. Also, the global maximum frequency of trigrams is 1,196 (i.e., n ¼ 1;196). For the rest of this section, we set w 1 ¼ 20 (i.e., much less than n) and show its effect on the performance of SJCM apr .
Five random document pairs are selected from the collection of 500 documents and the effectiveness of SJCM apr is compared with SJCM sic by varying w 0 . Note that SJCM sic always return 100 percent accurate results. The Accuracy out results, averaged over five random document pairs, are given in Fig. 2a . As expected, the accuracy drops when w 0 increases. When w 0 ¼ 10, the value of Accuracy out is 1.009 and SJCM apr produces a result that is 0.9 percent overestimated in comparison to that of from SJCM sic . However, the accuracy drops to 93.2 and 92 percent (underestimation) when w 0 is 15 and 20, respectively. The increase in error with w 0 justifies our theoretical analysis in Section 7.
For any given i 2 ½0; m À 1, the complexities for SJCM apr and SJCM sic are shown in Table 4 (refer to [36] for more details). For K = 1,024 bits, we computed the running times of SJCM apr and SJCM sic for varying w 0 . As shown in Fig. 2b , when w 0 ¼ 5, the running times (averaged over five random pairs) of SJCM apr and SJCM sic are 7.48 and 64.51 minutes, respectively. That is, SJCM apr is approximately eight times faster than SJCM sic . As w 0 increases, the running time of SJCM sic remains constant at 64.51 minutes since it is independent of w 0 whereas the running time of SJCM apr decreases with an increase in w 0 . Overall, the running time of SJCM apr drops from 7.48 to 4.54 minutes when w 0 varies from 5 to 20; thus, improving efficiency by a factor of 14 compared to SJCM sic .
Also, we randomly selected two documents and computed the ABS error by fixing w 0 and w 1 to 10 and 20, respectively (note that m ¼ 21;726). Since w 0 ¼ 10, following from Equation (8), the upper bound for ABS error is 2. For 0 i 21; 726, the absolute error between jD 1 \ D 2 j and its approximated value computed from SJCM apr is as shown in Fig. 2c . It is clear that for any given index i, the value of ABS error is always less than or equal to the maximum error which justifies our analysis in Section 7.
Further, we compared the theoretical estimated absolute errors (as per Equation (6)) with the actual observed errors from the real dataset (averaged over random pairs) for varying values of w 0 . The results are shown in Table 5 . It is clear that our theoretical analysis provides a strict bound for SJCM apr .
Directions for performance improvement. Though our protocols can be costly for large m, we emphasize that they can still achieve reasonable efficiency for large m when the underlying computations, as much as possible, are moved to an offline phase (for computing encryptions of random numbers, 0s, 1s, and, so on) [39] . To further improve efficiency, this approach can be combined with hashing techniques, where the domain size m can be first mapped into a smaller domain m 0 ((m ) using existing hashing techniques (e.g., universal hash functions) and then our protocols can be directly applied on domain size m 0 . Hashbased technique has been shown to be effective in existing work [20] , [40] . Further, since operations at index i are independent of the operations at index j, our protocols, as in [41] , can be parallelized to drastically improve the performance, for 1 i; j m and i 6 ¼ j, especially when the computations can be outsourced and performed by cloud service providers. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a secure protocol to compute the random shares of the intersection size between two privately owned multisets based on Jaccard Coefficient. Also, we presented an approximated and more efficient version (SJCM apr ) of the proposed protocol. The SJCM apr protocol improves the efficiency by reducing the number of column vectors (dimensions) of the frequency matrices. Our experiments on both the simulated and real datasets showed that SJCM apr provides a good accuracy and is also more efficient than the existing methods. To further improve its efficiency, we will explore the above performance improvement techniques. Specifically, we can use existing hashing (e.g., universal hashes and minhashes) and dimensionality reduction methods to map unique elements from a larger domain m into a smaller domain. Then we can build the frequency matrices based on the smaller domain. We will investigate these extensions in our future work. " For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
